Category: project: concepts & reasoning

Law as magic: Max Gladstone’s Craft Sequence and the case of social ontology

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In September, I attended and presented at GikII 2023, a conference on law, technology, and popular culture. The idea of linking law in Max Gladstone’s Craft Sequence to social ontology and legal theory had been fermenting in my mind for a while, so this was the perfect opportunity to finally put that idea on paper (or, as the case may be, into a power point presentation).

In this blog post, I want to reproduce (parts of) my presentation and slides. Bear in mind that the talk was about 10 minutes, so naturally, there’s much more to be said about just about any part of this. But if I can show how law in the world of the Craft Sequence links to law, legal reasoning and legal theory in our world, I’m happy – and if anyone’s entertained as well, all the better. I know I had fun with this one!

Continue reading “Law as magic: Max Gladstone’s Craft Sequence and the case of social ontology” →

The dual challenge from AI and the cognitive sciences for law and legal (reasoning) practices

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What do a man claiming that a brain tumour caused his paedophilic behaviour, an AI system called DABUS being recognised as an inventor for the purposes of a patent application, and the modelling of legal reasoning in computational form have in common? They are examples of developments in and increasing insights from the fields of artificial intelligence and the cognitive sciences that challenge extant legal (reasoning) practices in various ways. This paper proposes an analytical framework for the purposes of situating these different challenges vis-à-vis each other and our legal (reasoning) practices. The aim of this framework is to facilitate understanding how they relate to each other, what it is they really challenge, and to critically reflect on them.

Waltermann A. 2023. The Dual Challenge from AI and the Cognitive Sciences for Law and Legal
(Reasoning) Practices, in Brigaglia M., Roversi C. (eds.), Legal Reasoning and Cognitive Science: Topics
and Perspectives, «Diritto & Questioni pubbliche», Special Publication, August 2023, forthcoming.
(Preview published online on 19.07.2023)

On the logic(s) of international law

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Recently, my colleague Henrique Marcos and I organised a conference on the logic of international law to bring together scholars in public international law and in legal theory/legal logic.

We discuss the event and the conclusions for international legal reasoning and legal scholarship we’ve drawn from it in this blog post.

Sovereignty and validity

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Austin defined law as the commands of a sovereign. This paper investigates the relation between the concept of sovereignty and legal validity, departing from Austin’s jurisprudence by distinguishing between constitutive and constituted sovereignty. The aim of this paper is not to prescribe one particular understanding of law, sovereignty, or validity. Rather, it is to investigate what implications one particular understanding of sovereignty has for our understanding of law and validity. Accordingly, this paper posits that a focus on popular sovereignty, which is constitutive, does not cohere well with certain understandings of legal validity, namely validity from pedigree and validity from reason. The understanding of validity that fits best with a focus on popular sovereignty is from acceptance, and a further distinction can be made in this regard with acceptance of an institutional system of law and acceptance of individual rules.

Waltermann, A. (2019). Sovereignty and Validity: On the Relation Between the Concepts and the Role of Acceptance. In P. Westerman, J. Hage, S. Kirste, & A. R. Mackor (Eds.), Legal Validity and Soft Law (pp. 203). Springer. Law and Philosophy Library No. 122 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77522-7_11

Exceptions in international law

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Exceptions to rules play an important role in law, and in particular in international law. A proper understanding of exceptions is therefore of crucial importance for legal practice, legal doctrine and legal theory. In order to understand the role of exceptions in international law, this chapter – co-authored with Jaap Hage and Gustavo Arosemena – distinguishes between applicability and application of rules. An exception to a rule in a case is defined as the situation in which a rule is applicable to, but nevertheless not applied to, the case. This is possible because the applicability of a rule is merely considered to be a reason for applying the rule, which can be outweighed by reasons against application. This chapter argues that exceptions to rules are made mainly for two purposes: to create a division in the burden of proof, or because the legal consequences of the rule in the case are undesirable. The chapter also discusses techniques used by law to avoid rule conflicts and the need for making exceptions, including subscripting, scope limitations, interpretation, derogation, incorporation and reference, and limitations on rule-creating powers.

Hage, J., Waltermann, A., & Arosemena Solorzano, G. (2020). Exceptions in International Law. In L. Bartels, & F. Paddeu (Eds.), Exceptions in international law (pp. 11-34). Oxford University Press.