Category: project: non-human agents

The dual challenge from AI and the cognitive sciences for law and legal (reasoning) practices

amwaltermannLeave a comment

What do a man claiming that a brain tumour caused his paedophilic behaviour, an AI system called DABUS being recognised as an inventor for the purposes of a patent application, and the modelling of legal reasoning in computational form have in common? They are examples of developments in and increasing insights from the fields of artificial intelligence and the cognitive sciences that challenge extant legal (reasoning) practices in various ways. This paper proposes an analytical framework for the purposes of situating these different challenges vis-à-vis each other and our legal (reasoning) practices. The aim of this framework is to facilitate understanding how they relate to each other, what it is they really challenge, and to critically reflect on them.

Waltermann A. 2023. The Dual Challenge from AI and the Cognitive Sciences for Law and Legal
(Reasoning) Practices, in Brigaglia M., Roversi C. (eds.), Legal Reasoning and Cognitive Science: Topics
and Perspectives, «Diritto & Questioni pubbliche», Special Publication, August 2023, forthcoming.
(Preview published online on 19.07.2023)

Responsibility, Liability, and Retribution

amwaltermannLeave a comment
Photo by Loc Dang on Pexels.com

This chapter, co-authored with Jaap Hage, focuses on the relationship between liability in (criminal) law, responsibility, and retribution. It addresses the question of whether law – in particular criminal law – should base liability on responsibility and whether responsibility should be based on retributivism. In examining these questions, the aim of the chapter is to present the main lines of the debates surrounding them and to examine whether – and if so, how – compatibilism is a means to reconcile the different positions within those debates. A central role in this regard is reserved for a social practice we call ‘the practice of agency’ and the tension between two different ways of looking at the world around us, namely the phenomenological and the realist way.

Hage, J., & Waltermann, A. (2021). Responsibility, Liability, and Retribution. In B. Brozek, J. Hage, & N. Vincent (Eds.), Law and Mind: A Survey of Law and the Cognitive Sciences (pp. 255-288). Cambridge University Press. Law and the Cognitive Sciences https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108623056.013

On the legal responsibility of artificially intelligent entities

amwaltermannLeave a comment
Photo by Tara Winstead on Pexels.com

In this paper, I tackle three misconceptions regarding the legal responsibility of artificially intelligent entities, namely that they

(a) cannot be held legally responsible for their actions, because they do not have the prerequisite characteristics to be ‘real agents’ and therefore cannot ‘really’ act.

(b) should not be held legally responsible for their actions, because they do not have the prerequisite characteristics to be ‘real agents’ and therefore cannot ‘really’ act.

(c) should not be held legally responsible for their actions, because to do so would allow other (human or corporate) agents to ‘hide’ behind the AI and escape responsibility that way, while they are the ones who should be held responsible.

Waltermann, A. (2021). On the legal responsibility of artificially intelligent agents: Addressing three misconceptions. Technology and Regulation, 2021, 35-43. https://techreg.org/index.php/techreg/article/view/79

Law, Science and Rationality

amwaltermannLeave a comment

This edited volume brings together scholars in the field of law and the cognitive sciences to analyze and illustrate what the current relationship between law and the cognitive sciences is and what it should be from a theoretical perspective, for example by asking in what way and to what extent insights from the cognitive sciences can and should impact legal concepts, rules and paradigms. The topic of criminal responsibility exemplifies this relationship and several authors analyze specific elements of criminal responsibility in light of insights from the cognitive sciences.

Waltermann, A., Roef, D., Hage, J., & Jelicic, M. (Eds.) (2019). Law, Science and Rationality. Eleven International publishing. Maastricht Law Series Vol. 14

Why non-human agency?

amwaltermannLeave a comment

In this piece, I focus on the topic of acts of non-human entities and sketch out why I consider this a relevant field of research for academics from law, philosophy, the social and the cognitive sciences.

Waltermann, A. (2019). Why non-human agency? In A. Waltermann, D. Roef, J. Hage, & M. Jelicic (Eds.), Law, Science and Rationality (pp. 51-72). Eleven International publishing. Maastricht Law Series Vol. 14